Will the Ankara-Damascus dialogue end before it begins?

You know that I have been closely following the Türkiye-Syria dialogue process. Recently, there has been a growing sentiment that "this won't work." This is evidenced by Assad's latest conditional statement. Some believe multiple obstacles are trying to derail the process. Will the Ankara-Damascus dialogue end before it begins? From what I gather, this is not the case. Let me explain.

Ankara's approach is clear. President Erdoğan initiated the process with a positive message, emphasizing Syria's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Contrary to what some might think, this announcement in June wasn't out of the blue. It was the result of two months of indirect dialogue.

This process began with President Erdoğan's visit to Baghdad in April. When Iraq proposed hosting the talks in Baghdad, Türkiye didn't object. Over time, Iraq shuttled between the two capitals. Eventually, it led to setting the agenda. We are only learning about this now.

ASSAD'S CONFUSING STATEMENT

Assad's initial response to Ankara's positive message, under the supervision of Putin's special envoy to Syria, Lavrentiev, was also positive. The regime relaxed its condition of "withdraw your troops" to "create a withdrawal timeline." This was a step toward softening their stance. In response, President Erdoğan said he could invite Assad. A few days later, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuat Hussein announced that Iraq would host Turkish and Syrian officials. On the same day, Erdoğan's statement that he had assigned the task to Hakan Fidan to create a roadmap was reported in the media.

However, a confusing statement followed. The Syrian Foreign Ministry reasserted its previously relaxed conditions. This raises the question, "Will the dialogue end before it begins?"

TALKS TO BE HELD IN BAGHDAD

The answer to this question is "No." The talks, from what I can analyze, will begin soon. I believe Syria's conditional statement pertains to the "Erdoğan-Assad meeting." I don't think they have completely closed the door on dialogue (if they do, they will be squeezed into the Israel-US-PKK triangle). The signals indicate otherwise.

If we take Iraqi Foreign Minister Hussein's statement at face value, the Syrian regime seems to have accepted holding lower-level talks and shaping the dialogue process roadmap in Baghdad, even if not at the leader or ministerial level. This is despite the clear indication that Ankara has not provided and will not provide a timeline for troop withdrawal under these conditions.

IRAN'S SURPRISE: GOOD OR BAD?

The process is still fragile, and there will be those who try to influence or sabotage it. The US is playing its cards openly, stating that it does not support normalization efforts. The PKK terrorist organization is unhappy with the process. I will detail a relevant development at the end of this piece.

There are also actors who don't speak openly but propose solutions that put them at the center and try to "control" the process.

Let me share an interesting piece of information. During the Development Road talks between Ankara and Baghdad, Tehran anticipated being left out and proposed that the Development Road pass through Iran. This was, of course, rejected. A similar situation might have occurred in the current context. It is possible and fits the natural flow of events.

Why is Tehran acting this way? According to those familiar with the issue: One, the normalization between Türkiye and Syria would render Iran's presence in the country meaningless. The strategic loss experienced in Nagorno-Karabakh and the South Caucasus would spread to the Middle East. Two, the logistics line reaching Hezbollah would be lost, cutting off the Mediterranean connection. Three, and this is very interesting: Tehran doesn't know what to do with the tens of thousands of militiamen it has in Syria if it withdraws them.

It is said that a similar sentiment pervades Russia's approach. The Russians' opposition to the Baghdad location is no secret. This should not be surprising. No one wants to lose initiative on such an important, multifaceted, and complicated issue.

THE FIRST FRUIT OF DIALOGUE

Ankara's dialogue initiative has already yielded its first regional fruit. Let me explain how. You had previously read about the US's plan for the region in this column: To tie the PKK's Syrian branch to Damascus with a fragile thread, then get Damascus to talk to Saudi Arabia, forming an anti-Iran consortium in the region.

There were behind-the-scenes Washington-Damascus talks on this. Assad was cornered. Then came Assad's statement about contact with the terrorist organization. During this period, the PKK terrorist organization began paving the way for independence through so-called local elections, while Damascus could only watch the developments.

Ankara's step towards dialogue strengthened the Assad regime's hand against the terrorist organization. It gave Damascus some room to maneuver. Assad used this new context to pressure the terrorist organization. During this period, the PKK made a statement saying, "Damascus does not respect our expectations." Reports suggested tensions between regime soldiers and PKK members at certain points. And bingo: Reports indicated that PKK militants had carried out attacks on some regime positions. (During Türkiye's operations against ISIS in Syria, the PKK had transferred ISIS militants through its territory to the conflict zone.) In other words, Damascus was going to reconcile with the PKK under US pressure. But tensions escalated. This is the first fruit of the dialogue.

This is a complex issue with many stakeholders and deep psychological and sociological baggage. It will take more time to resolve. But diplomacy is a matter of patience. Let's continue to observe.