The game is changing: Get ready for surprises in Syria

In Syria, there was a status quo with the US, Iran, Russia, and Türkiye maintaining their positions. When the Ankara-Damascus normalization process emerged, this status quo was disrupted. CENTCOM (US Central Command), which handles the Syria file, feared losing its place if normalization occurred and thus introduced a new strategy: merging terrorist structures in northern Iraq and Syria to expand its influence. In response, Ankara sat down with Iraq, collaborating on counter-terrorism and directly targeting high-ranking PKK members protected by CENTCOM in northern Syria. Tensions rose with the US, but a new balance was established.

Now, we face a new scenario. Washington is considering withdrawing from Syria to focus on China. If the US leaves Syria, it will be a game-changer, disrupting the status quo. Even discussing this possibility has shaken things up, prompting actors to prepare for a post-US Syria. This could lead to new tensions and significant surprises.

What do the actors want?

The US’s primary goal for withdrawal is ensuring Israel’s security, securing a Riyadh-Tel Aviv agreement, balancing Iran with a Saudi-led consortium, and pulling the Assad regime away from Iran towards Saudi Arabia. (Two key developments: Assad mentioned occasional talks with the US, calling politics the art of the possible, and Riyadh appointed an ambassador to Damascus.) Then, the plan is to exit the region.

What about the PKK’s Syrian branch, the YPG? My sources say the US wants to avoid a repeat of the Afghanistan exit debacle and the perception of being an unreliable ally. Thus, they are planning an "exit" strategy for the YPG, aiming to grant partial autonomy in Syria and loosely tie the terrorist group to Damascus. (Two significant developments: the US opposed the so-called local elections but defined the area as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, and Assad announced plans for a dialogue aimed at a political solution with the northern Syrian entity.)

What will Russia and Iran do? Russia is focused on Ukraine, with Syria on the back burner (including the Syria-Türkiye normalization file). However, they are silently allowing Israeli attacks on Iranian targets in Syria (a result of a US-Israel-Russia agreement).

Recently, a crucial piece of information emerged: Russia’s Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Kabulov, announced that comprehensive agreement talks between Russia and Iran are on hold, confirmed by Foreign Minister Lavrov. Whether this signifies a rift between Russia and Iran and how it will impact Syria remains to be seen.

Previously, Assad couldn’t act independently of Russian-Iranian influence. He couldn’t negotiate on his behalf and didn’t advance the Türkiye normalization process due to Iran’s opposition, despite Putin’s encouragement. However, if the US withdraws from Syria, Assad will need to engage with Ankara. The circumstances will compel Damascus to do so.

Assad’s recent statements on the US and the terrorist group indicate that the Syrian regime is closely monitoring developments. For instance, a report from Iraqi media suggested that Iraqi Prime Minister Sudani wants to facilitate dialogue between Ankara and Damascus and has discussed it with the parties involved. Although my diplomatic and intelligence sources couldn’t confirm this, the emerging situation clearly fosters regional expectations of a renewed Ankara-Damascus normalization process.

Damascus’s precondition for normalization with Ankara was the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria. Assad had stated, “We are not open to normalization unless Turkish forces withdraw.” However, there’s now a shift in rhetoric in Damascus. Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad said, “The fundamental condition for dialogue is Türkiye’s readiness to declare its intent to withdraw from our lands” (June 1). Thus, the precondition for normalization has eased from actual withdrawal to a declaration of intent. This is significant.

A few days after Mekdad’s statement, Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler’s comments were reported. Güler said, “We are ready to support the adoption of an inclusive constitution, the holding of free elections, comprehensive normalization, and the establishment of a secure environment. After these are accomplished and our border security is fully ensured, we may consider withdrawal if necessary.” Ankara’s stance remains unchanged, but this declaration also indicates intent.

I believe Ankara is moving towards conducting these negotiations solely with Damascus. Currently, talks involve Türkiye, Syria, Russia, and Iran. Including different actors complicates the issue, as Ankara-Damascus problems are overshadowed by Moscow-Tehran concerns.

Ankara’s expectations for normalization are clear: Damascus must support counter-terrorism efforts, disarm the PKK, expel terrorists coming from Iraq to northern Syria, and ensure the safe return of refugees to their homeland.

The US will withdraw from Syria. If Assad wants to maintain the integrity of his country, he must talk to Türkiye. Ultimately, no other capital in the region besides Ankara is committed to preserving Syria’s territorial integrity.